26 October 2011
Yesterday the US dismantled the last B53 nuclear bomb, which was the largest yield nuclear weapon in the US nuclear arsenal, with a yield of about 9 megatons. This was not the highest yield US nuclear weapon ever fielded. This distinction belonged to the B41, with a yield of about 25 megatons. The last B41 was dismantled in July 1976. While the B41 was a very high yield bomb by any measure, it was not the highest yield nuclear device ever built. This distinction belonged to the Soviet-made AN602, commonly known as the Tsar Bomba. The highest yield US bomb ever exploded was the Castle Bravo test, which surprised its builders by an explosion of about 15 megatons, three times the expected yield of 4-6 megatons. The Tsar Bomba was a relatively “clean” bomb, while the B41 was the most efficient production-line nuclear bomb in terms of yield to weight ratio.
The B53 had a very long service life — nearly fifty years. With the end of the B53 we see the symbolic end of an era in strategic nuclear weapons. A bomb like the B53 or the B41 (or the Soviet RDS-9) could have, with a single blast, annihilated a contemporary megalopolis. It is interesting to note that the vastly expanded cities of today began to emerge at about the same time as nuclear weapons were invented, so that in this admittedly bizarre sense, the means of civilization to destroy itself perfectly kept pace with the scope and extent of the expanding urbanization of civilization. Of course, a contemporary megalopolis could be destroyed by multiple warheads, and most missiles and many other delivery systems are MIRVed and therefore have many warheads at their disposal, there is a certain elegance to the strategic calculus of one bomb, one city — this the ethos of the sniper — one shot, one kill — put into practice on a macroscopic scale.
It should be obvious that, had the US and the Soviet Union chosen to continue to design and build bigger nuclear weapons, that this capacity was technically within their grasp. Perhaps it would be possible to build a bomb with a yield of 500 megatons, or perhaps even a gigaton bomb. But there was nothing large enough to destroy to make it worth the while to attempt to build such devices. And then the paradigm or war began to shift. Ultimately, even nuclear weapons design began to incorporate features of precisification. Mature experimentation with nuclear weapons design included innovative shaped charges and miniaturization.
The age of the nuclear weapon as a purely strategic device is passing. Technologies of precisification and miniaturization are useful; you can do something with a precise or miniaturized nuclear device. It may sound odd to remark that a weapon is useful, but we must remember that throughout the Cold War nuclear weapons were strictly useless, present only to guarantee mutually assured destruction. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that nuclear weapons had only a strategic use. If the nuclear powers chose not to build bigger bombs, and eventually chose to decommission and dismantle their largest warheads, this tells us that the strategic situation has changed, and that the strategic calculation has changed with the strategic situation.
The limitation of the size of nuclear weapons and the decommissioning of larger weapons did not come about as a result of political pressure. While the B53 was old, there was no political pressure to eliminate it from the arsenal. The same cannot be said, for example, of the neutron bomb, which was not built for political reasons, or the Swedish nuclear weapons program, which was ended for economic reasons. These strategic decisions were strictly voluntary on the part of strategic planners, and as such they represent the purest expression of strategic thought.
More than a year ago in The Atomic Age Turns 65 I wrote about the 65th anniversary of the Hiroshima nuclear blast. There I observed that, “What we now usually call the Second World War was also the First Nuclear War.” I also noted that there has been no Second Nuclear War. In the same spirit of unfamiliar periodization, we could call this period of time from the first use of nuclear weapons to the dismantling of the largest bomb the First Nuclear Age, which lasted less than seventy years. During the First Nuclear Age, bigger was better. Now bigger is no longer better, and we have entered the brave new world of the Second Nuclear Age, in which the proliferation of nuclear weapons seems likely and the concern of nuclear terrorism is a much greater danger than a massive decapitation strike in the form of ICBMs, bombers, and SLBMs.
As the strategic logic of the Second Nuclear Age continues to unfold, nuclear doctrine will continue to change and adapt itself to changed circumstances. In the long term, these changes will eventually be concretely manifested in the nuclear arsenal. Given the slow pace of transition from doctrinal development to weapons production, the fact that world nuclear arsenals are already changing points to the reality of strategic change and confirms the End of a Nuclear Era.
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29 August 2011
The “tradition of non-use” refers to the non-use of nuclear weapons since the initial use of nuclear weapons to bring an end to the Second World War, which, as I have observed elsewhere, could as well be called the First Nuclear War. This tradition of non-use is striking, and perhaps even historically unprecedented. I cannot think of another weapons system produced in such great quantity and maintained the ready for use, that nevertheless remained unused for better than sixty years.
The possible exceptions to this would include other weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The traditional triumvirate of WMD includes nulclear, biological, and chemical weapons. As we know, chemical weapons were used many times during the First World War, though to little strategic effect. During the Second World War, stocks of chemical weapons were available, but despite the “total” character of the world, both Axis and Allies chose to observe a tradition of non-use of chemical weapons. Biological weapons are more difficult to pin down because of their historical precedent, but biological weapons in their contemporary form — i.e., in the form of weaponized biological agents stockpiled as a strategic deterrent — have been treated much like chemical and nuclear weapons.
With the first appearance of WMD in history, these technologies were part of a natural and logical process of escalation, which involved doing with other means what had already been done with conventional means. This was especially the case with nuclear weapons, which allowed for the destruction on cities simply and cheaply, although the destruction of cities had already been accomplished by more costly and more labor- and material-intensive methods. There was no reason not to use WMD once they become available, and there were many reasons to use them. And so they were used.
Like the transition from armor and shock weapons to gunpowder and cannon, the transition from conventional weapons to WMD was gradual, but with a much faster and steeper growth curve once science-driven technology began making WMD available in a systematic way. At some point this gradual transition came to be viewed in hindsight in terms of before and after and either/or — with the systematic use of the weapons system equated with apocalypse, cataclysm, and extinction. The incremental introduction of WMD was retrospectively perceived as a pivot point. That is to say, with the vision of nuclear annihilation vividly in the minds of everyone, we came to view the contemporary world as the Axial Age of Weapons Systems.
The doctrine that emerged from the Axial Age of Weapons systems was the tradition of non-use. However, it ought to be remarked that WMD had strategic use, so that their tradition of non-use was a doctrine of substrategic non-use. This strategic use coupled with operational and tactical non-use had a self-perpetuating character that isolated WMD from other weapons systems. Strategically, WMD proliferated, yet tactically and operationally they had no place in warfighting. Despite some limited attempts to create tactical nukes for use in theater, these efforts dwindled and the withered away under pressure to create fully strategic nukes. This constitutes a kind of allopatric speciation, in which weapons systems were forced apart in their adaptation to a a role that emerged in competition with other weapons systems. These weapons systems grew apart.
With the emergence of the Devolution of Warfare, the speciation of weapons systems encountered changed environmental conditions that favored conventional weapons and selected against WMD. This should not surprise us. It is one of the lessons of history that weapons systems must be fielded and put into use if they are to be used effectively. The role of strategic weapons systems guarantees that they will be insulated from this kind of effective use derived from experience. The more that they grow into their role — i.e., the more absolutely destructive they become — the more useless they become, and the more useless WMD become, the less likely that they could be employed effectively in combat operations.
The only role for WMD is not to be used, and so the doctrine of non-use makes them even more useless over time. Why, then to nation-states pursue WMD so relentlessly? Because their substrategic non-use has been coupled with their strategic use, and on a strategic level of isolation of WMD that has occurred as a result of the speciation of weapons systems has led some to the conclusion that only WMD can deliver on strategic ambitions.
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20 August 2011
Further to yesterday’s post, Constraint and Devolution, it has occurred to me that there is a close relationship between the two distinct tactical trends of constraint and devolution.
Weapons systems designed under political constraints are mostly weapons systems devolved from absolute destructiveness. While nuclear weapons were employed tactically at the close of the Second World War (which was also the First Nuclear War), the emergence of multiple nuclear powers with large stockpiles of nuclear weapons made nuclear weapons into purely strategic weapons systems that could not be used tactically without justifiable fears of escalation to the point of mutually assured destruction.
There are many political constraints on weapons systems, for example: 1) in terms of numbers of weapons and weapons programs, 2) expenses of the same, 3) frequency of use, 4) destructiveness of use, and 5) collateral damage inflicted.
1) Nuclear weapons stockpiled during the Cold War were judged to be a threat simply in virtue of their existence in large numbers; disarmament efforts often focused on reducing the numbers of nuclear warheads, delivery systems for nuclear warheads, and reducing the throw weights of missiles.
2) The F-22, the world’s first fifth generation air superiority fighter, and probably a superior airframe in comparison to the F-35, has been cancelled due to its expense.
3) It sometimes happens that the isolated use of a weapons system goes but little remarked, while the proliferation of a weapons system begins to be noted in the press and political pressure builds for the limitation of proliferating weapons systems. We have seen this in relation to landmines, cluster bomblets, and white phosphorus munitions.
4) Especially large-scale destructiveness, or weapons systems that cause especially gruesome injuries (which seem to attract the press more than outright deaths), create political pressure to limit their production, deployment, and use. Although physicist Leó Szilárd proposed the Cobalt bomb as early as 1950, no such bomb was built because its destructiveness was potentially too great. Since that time the scope of destructiveness has contracted to the point that the only weapons system that is politically acceptable is a precision weapons system (on which cf. no. 5, below).
5) The exponential increase of precision munitions is largely driven by the political need to minimize collateral damage. This has been perhaps the single most significant development driving weapons research in the past quarter century.
These constraints taken together — and this list I created off the top of my head, and is therefore in no respect to be considered exhaustive — force a devolution of war down to a scale at which effective action can only be taken by small fire teams with advanced weapons, or a single platform (jet, ship, helicopter, tank, etc.) mounting smart weapons systems.
There is hardly any place any more in contemporary warfare for conventional engagements. There will continue to be sporadic exceptions, like the take-down of Iraq, but this too, after the conventional phase, passed over into extended unconventional, asymmetrical, and irregular warfare.
At the same time that political constraints drive devolution, the devolution to small, highly mobile fire teams, as well as militant proxies and irregular forces, drives the demand for disproportionately effective small weapons systems — ideally, weapons systems that can be carried by an individual, but which will possess the precision destructiveness made possible by miniaturization and high technology.
The devolution of weapons systems involves a devolution of responsibility to small fire teams and irregular forces, which as a practical matter of fact must often involve a parallel devolution of authority to these same entities. The success and extrapolation of infiltration tactics since the closing stages of the First World War, and subsequently codified into doctrine during the Second World War, demonstrated to every large institutional military the importance of delegating authority and encouraging the initiative down to the level of the individual fire team.
The devolution of authority that follows from the decisive need to exploit the initiative and the politically driven constraint on weapons systems means that combat decisions will be more decentralized than ever. In practical terms, this means that decisions will be made at the far periphery of the political apparatus, and from this development we can expect to see an increase in limited, local atrocities from small combat teams that take decisions in the heat of battle and without oversight from more politically astute commanders closer to the centers of power but farther from the firefight.
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19 August 2011
A news item today was interesting on several levels. Matt McGrath, Science reporter for the BBC, reported in US military develops ‘bigger bang’ explosive material that a successful test of High-Density Reactive Materials (HDRM) demonstrated that an inert casing could be replaced with this material to great effect. The HDRM is as strong as steel, but detonates when it strikes its target, unlike an inert steel casing that only serves to hold a high explosive charge.
Materials technology is among the most promising areas of weapons research, although it doesn’t get the attention of big and expensive weapons systems, especially that those are the products of big, sexy science, which are usually aimed at big, sexy targets — like the Chinese DF21-D anti-carrier missile. Better casings, better charges, and better gun barrels would all make an immediate difference in the efficacy of proven weapons systems.
Two quotes from the BBC article were of particular interest to me. Here is the first one:
“US Navy scientists say that projectiles made from the new compound are less likely to kill innocent bystanders.”
“Because the new material reacts and explodes on impact, Dr Bedford believes it could cause fewer casualties among innocent bystanders.”
This is a perfect example of what I wrote about in Political Constraints on Weapons Systems. The US is not working on the most destructive weapons systems imaginable, and is not looking for overwhelming force. Rather, US research is aimed at perfecting weapons systems that are politically acceptable, and which can be used in the context of the constraints under which the US operates. This point, I think, is insufficiently appreciated, particularly in light of the heated rhetoric which is directed against the world’s only current superpower. If the US wanted to simply wipe a nation-state off the face of the earth, it could do so, and with impunity.
If the US wanted to get really good at the utter annihilation of adversaries, it could probably do this too. But we do not see weapons systems in development that would accomplish this. Even very large yield conventional weapons seem to interest the Russians more than the US (since it is the Russians who have developed the Father of All Bombs, not to mention the Tsar Bomba of the Cold War). Instead, the US develops and perfects precision munitions that can eliminate military targets with almost a preternatural ability to spare civilians (again, heated rhetoric to the contrary, as I am going by the historical record).
Here is the other quote that particularly got my attention:
“The researcher says the materials could ultimately be applied to grenades and bullets as well as larger weapons.”
Before new technologies reach the battlefield, and before any coherent doctrine emerges for the employment of new weapons technologies, it is always difficult to say whether these technologies alter the balance in favor of the offense or the defense. In terms of the development of High-Density Reactive Materials (HDRM), it certainly isn’t intuitively obvious to me that it favors the offense or the defense. However, it does seem to me that this technology further tips the balance in favor of irregular forces, whether these forces are engaged in offensive or defensive operations.
Every major military force in the world has large, heavy assets such as tanks and ships that would come in for greater and more concentrated damage from HDRM shells, while conventional shells are entirely adequate for the targeting of individual soldiers, so that no advantage is gained by targeting irregular forces with this new technology, while irregular forces in possession of this technology would gain a significant advantage by employing small, mobile weapons systems which pack a bigger punch against armored assets.
Thus HDRM shells for smaller, hand-held weapons systems (I imagine this would work particularly well for mortars and RPGs) fall into a category like that of the XM25, which I characterized as being the precisification of small arms fire. both give an advantage to small, mobile irregular forces. However, no “irregular” forces in the traditional understanding of that term would have access to such advanced weapons systems. It would only be in the case that a technologically advanced nation-state chose to arm militant proxies, or if such a nation-state sought to constitute its own quasi-irregular forces, that such weapons systems could realize their full potential.
Under either of these two aforementioned conditions, the Devolution of War can continue apace.
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17 August 2011
Unfurling the Panopticon for
Total Battlespace Situational Awareness
The idea of the panopticon is due to the English utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham. Utilitarians were the “modern” and “progressive” thinkers of the 19th century, ready to dispense with tradition and replace it with radical ideas of their own. While the basic idea of utilitarianism — that we should do what is best for the greatest number of people — is very much with us today, a lot of the other utilitarian ideas have fallen by the wayside. One of the interestingly eccentric ideas of the utilitarians was that of the panopticon, which Bentham described as follows:
“A building circular… The prisoners in their cells, occupying the circumference — The officers in the centre. By blinds and other contrivances, the Inspectors concealed… from the observation of the prisoners: hence the sentiment of a sort of omnipresence — The whole circuit reviewable with little, or… without any, change of place. One station in the inspection part affording the most perfect view of every cell.”
Jeremy Bentham, Proposal for a New and Less Expensive mode of Employing and Reforming Convicts, London, 1798
The spirit of the idea of the panopticon was thus that of an advanced concept in penal reform — reformers are always focusing on the penal system, since this is filled with the people most perceived to need reform — but the reason that the idea of the panopticon is so well known today is that it was taken up by Michel Foucault and prominently discussed in his book Discipline and Punish.
In Foucault’s context, the panopticon is only secondarily a humane concept of penal reform. For Foucault, the panopticon is primarily a central exhibit in the development of the modern surveillance state in which bodies are observed, managed, regulated, and subordinated to regimentation and control that may be superficially humane but is at a deeper level a form of “bio-power.”
Here is how Foucault described the panopticon:
“Hence the major effect of the Panopticon: to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power. So to arrange things that the surveillance is permanent in its effects, even if it is discontinuous in its action; that the perfection of power should tend to render its actual exercise unnecessary; that this architectural apparatus should be a machine for creating and sustaining a power relation independent of the person who exercises it; in short, that the inmates should be caught up in a power situation of which they are themselves the bearers. To achieve this, it is at once too much and too little that the prisoner should be constantly observed by an inspector: too little, for what matters is that he knows himself to be observed; too much, because he has no need in fact of being so. In view of this, Bentham laid down the principle that power should be visible and unverifiable. Visible: the inmate will constantly have before his eyes the tall outline of the central tower from which he is spied upon. Unverifiable: the inmate must never know whether he is being looked at at any one moment; but he must be sure that he may always be so. In order to make the presence or absence of the inspector unverifiable, so that the prisoners, in their cells, cannot even see a shadow, Bentham envisaged not only venetian blinds on the windows of the central observation hall, but, on the inside, partitions that intersected the hall at right angles and, in order to pass from one quarter to the other, not doors but zig-zag openings; for the slightest noise, a gleam of light, a brightness in a half-opened door would betray the presence of the guardian. The Panopticon is a machine for dissociating the see/being seen dyad: in the peripheric ring, one is totally seen, without ever seeing; in the central tower, one sees everything without ever being seen.”
Michel Foucault, Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison, New York: Vintage Books, 1995, pp. 195-228, translated from the French by Alan Sheridan (translation 1977)
Several actual prisons were built on the panopticon model, but the larger point that Foucault is making is one of universal surveillance. This universal surveillance — the nation-state as all seeing eye, divinely omnipotent — is coming true in other ways — for example, the ubiquitous presence of cameras in public spaces — so that no one expects privacy any more as soon as they step outside the door of their home. People assume they are being watched, so by and large they conduct themselves as obedient citizens. (However, some comments on the recent riots in London have suggested that this policing-by-camera is ultimately ineffective.)
Another concept that has emerged from the milieu of surveillance is that of situational awareness. I was interested to discover that Wikipedia has quite a long and detailed article on situational awareness, which is, in that context, treated after a quasi-scientific fashion. Foucault would have been fascinated by this.
I won’t go into the details of situational awareness, but I will cite one definition specific to the strategico-tactical nexus: Fred Burton and Scott Stewart of Strategic Forecasting define situational awareness as follows: “Situational awareness is the process of recognizing a threat at an early stage and taking measures to avoid it.”
In Foucault’s discussion of the panopticon is has already gone these more recent discussions of situational awareness one better by recognizing that in the panopticon, “in the peripheric ring, one is totally seen, without ever seeing; in the central tower, one sees everything without ever being seen.” This condition I will call asymmetrical situational awareness. Once we are aware, as it were, of asymmetrical situational awareness, we can immediately see the role that perpetuating this asymmetry plays in successful military operations. Asymmetrical situational awareness is to recognize and avoid threats while posing an unrecognized and unavoidable threat in turn. If one can establish and maintain this enviable state of affairs, one can act with impunity, and acting with impunity, while unpleasant in the ordinary business of life, is the difference between life and death on the battlefield — as well as the difference between winning and losing.
The panopticon is a structure conceived to realize asymmetrical situational awareness, favoring guards at the expense of prisoners. What if we could unfurl the rigid structure of the panopticon and enjoy its surveillance benefits in the real world? I suggest that the technology to do this is not far away. A perfect realization of asymmetrical situational awareness is not likely, but something close to totality of surveillance would make an enormous difference.
A couple of days ago in Vulnerabilities of Vertical Lift I suggested that the vulnerability of large helicopters could be partially addressed by deploying drones in a miniaturized version of the combat air patrol that surrounds a carrier strike group, protecting the vulnerability of large, slow, and valuable aircraft carriers. After I suggested this, I realized that this idea would be generalized, extrapolated, and detached from any particular weapons systems, such as a large, slow, complex and therefore vulnerable helicopter.
Imagine, if you will, a flock of drones deployed throughout a battlespace. With technological improvements of the not-too-distant future, miniaturization could make these small enough to be difficult to see, and still have a high degree of sensitivity that even sophisticated radar systems now used to monitor the battlespace do not possess. A sensor network of this kind might hover over the ground between, say, ten and fifty feet — obviously, it could move, reposition itself, and realign itself as events within the battlespace dictated.
A robust suite of sensing technologies could include ordinary visible spectrum cameras, as well as infrared cameras (to detect body heat), “sniffers” that could (if close enough) detect various chemical, bomb, and propellent residues, microphones of several specialized types, motion detectors, and anything else that scientists could think of to monitor events on the ground. This would be like an “early warning system” for the more traditional battlespace agents of tactical engagement, by which I mean individual soldiers, troop carriers, fighting vehicles, tanks, helicopters, and fixed wing aircraft.
The first iteration of such a technology would be vulnerable and clumsy, but it should be easy to see how something like this, refined and miniaturized, could deliver something like total battlespace situational awareness, and since a sensing network like this could only be produced by technologically advanced nation-states, it would possess the same kind of asymmetry that nuclear weapons once had and fifth generation jetfights now possess in regard to air superiority. In the case of such an asymmetry, this flock of drones would give nearly absolute asymmetrical situational awareness.
The greatest vulnerability of a sensing network of this kind would be its networking and control, which if hacked and hijacked could be rendered useless, or, worse, turned against those who built it. Thus information security would be paramount in constructing such a sensing network. If any clever young hacker with a radio control system could break in, it would be useless. Presumably advanced encryption would be employed in the control network, with safeguards built in that would render the entire network useless if compromised.
The next step beyond a sensing network would be to arm the network itself, so that the flock of drones would not only be the surveillance equivalent of an all seeing eye, but the eye could eliminate any threats that it discovered.
A sensing network of this kind would not only be useful for purely military missions, but would also have obvious applications in peacekeeping operations.
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Note Added 14 August 2012: Given what I wrote above almost exactly a year ago about the possibility of a flock of drones, it was with the greatest of interest that I read Bugs in the sky: Boeing showcases hard-to-detect drones that behave like a ‘swarm of insects’ from the Daily Mail. It seems that defense contractors were already working on something pretty similar to what I suggested. That is to be expected.
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15 August 2011
Helicopters have become indispensable to military operations of all kinds, yet helicopters remain vulnerable, if not fragile, pieces of equipment. Thus helicopters are used because they are indispensable, and their use results in fatalities because they are vulnerable. The obvious response to vertical lift vulnerability would be to up-armor helicopters, and of course this has been done — to the extent possible. Helicopters possess the speed and mobility that they do in virtue of their light weight. Heavy armor would defeat that mobility and speed, as well as reduce their carrying capacity, whether for soldiers or for guns and ammunition.
The vulnerability of helicopters has been dramatically and fatally revealed some years ago in Somalia, during the episode recounted in the book and the film Black Hawk Down, and again just earlier this month when a Boeing CH-47 Chinook helicopter was downed in Afghanistan, possibly by an “Improvised Rocket-Assisted Mortar” (IRAM).
A story in Wired magazine, Did a New Taliban Weapon Kill a Chopper Full of Navy SEALs? by David Axe quotes Army Lt. Col. Thomas Gukeisen as saying, “My biggest headache is vertical lift.” This headache follows logically from helicopter indispensability and vulnerability.
One approach to vertical lift vulnerability would be a seek an alternative weapons system. This was precisely the idea behind the V-22 Osprey. Because of its own troubled history the V-22 has not realized its full potential on the battlefield. But the idea is sound. The V-22 in its cruising mode would not be the “Complex, slow and low-flying” targets that helicopters are. Since the V-22 has proved problematic, helicopters remain the primary form of vertical lift for infantry infiltration.
In several posts — The End of the Age of the Aircraft Carrier, Stealth Helicopter Technology, and More Advanced Helicopter Technology among them — I have emphasized the future role of helicopters on the battlefield, and I do not mean to withdraw my comments on the possibilities of armored air assault taking the place of armored cavalry on the ground. Helicopters possess superior speed, superior mobility, superior flexibility, and in this sense they have local theater advantages over both armored cavalry and fixed wing aircraft.
Nevertheless, helicopter vulnerability remains an Achilles’ heel, and this Achilles’ heel both limits their usefulness and limits their employment in the kind of armored air thrust that I have envisioned. The advent of stealth helicopter technologies represents an important development in light of the visibility and audibility of helicopters, and any significant increase in helicopter stealth will result in a significant increase in survivability. (The stealth helicopter technologies recently discussed were of sufficient interest that it was reported in today’s Financial Times that Pakistan allowed Chinese engineers to look over the fragments of the destroyed helicopter left from the Bin Laden raid.) Next to stealth, the other obvious improvement to helicopter technology which could help them to realize their full potential on the battlefield would be to address the vulnerabilities that have been revealed in recent operations.
Helicopter vulnerability needs to be treated differently for vertical lift purposes and attack purposes. These distinct tactical roles involve distinct dangers and vulnerabilities. Some of these vulnerabilities can be addressed by changes in doctrine specifically formulated to address the threat. Doctrine will be distinct for vertical lift and gunships, so the evolution of doctrine in each case must follow an optimization dictated by the tactical role fulfilled by the aircraft.
The bulk of helicopter operations comprises vertical lift for infantry infiltration. The Black Hawk downed in Mogadishu and the Chinook downed in Afghanistan were involved in vertical lift operations, inserting and removing troops in a hostile environment. For this purpose large numbers of troops ride in the craft and the craft must touch down on the ground to perform its function. This makes all of the soldiers on the helicopter vulnerable.
Vertical lift helicopters could learn something from the experience of ships. Large ships are obviously very vulnerable, and this vulnerability has gone so far as to virtually eliminate the traditional battleship from the world’s ocean. The aircraft carrier is the largest naval vessel (valuable for the air arm it projects, and not for its big guns, which were traditionally the value of battleships), and it is very large indeed. Its size makes its highly vulnerable, and numerous counter-measures are in place to protect the vulnerable carrier. Indeed, the carrier does not merely employ counter-measures, but lies at the center of a Carrier Strike Group (CSG) or Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) that is constituted for the purpose of combined arms defense of the carrier.
All of this sounds rather distant from the concerns of vertical lift, but in an age of rapid technological innovation and miniaturization, counter-measures for vertical lift are not unthinkable. Troop-carrying vertical lift helicopters could be fitted with counter-missile batteries and something like a miniaturized version of the Phalanx CIWS (close in weapons system) to automatically engage with any incoming threats. While with ships radar-confusing chaff is employed to confuse radar-targeting systems for weapons, vertical lift helicopters are more vulnerable to visual line-of-sight weapons, so that counter-measures based on sight-confusing technologies could make the helicopter difficult to target — for example, lasers or sound systems might be employed to blind or deafen those targeting helicopters from the ground.
In the further future, employing technologies not yet available but clearly on the horizon, a vertical lift helicopter could have its own miniaturized equivalent of a combat air patrol. That is to say, miniaturized, automatically controlled drones, little more than guns and missile launchers hovering at a given distance from the central helicopter and networked by a central fire control computer, could scan for threats in the vicinity and, being closer, respond quicker to threats on the ground.
Helicopter gunships designed for attack are smaller, faster, and need not drop to the ground for the insertion and removal of troops. For this reason they are less vulnerable than helicopters used for vertical lift, but they are still vulnerable. Some of the suggestions above could be employed for helicopter gunships as well. A swarming mass of helicopter gunships could itself be linked together in a fire control network including outlying sensor drones perhaps flying lower and slower and therefore more sensitive to threats on the ground.
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25 July 2011
Last Friday in Report: China building electromagnetic pulse weapons for use against U.S. carriers, the Washington Times reported on China’s development of an EMP weapons system. The story has subsequently been picked up by several media outlets that have repeated its content and elaborated in some cases.
The EMP weapons system in question is said to be an element of China’s so-called “Assassin’s Mace” (shashou-jian, 手锏), which is not a single weapons system but an umbrella term drawn from traditional Chinese strategic thought, to indicate a range of weapons systems being developed by the Chinese to counter overwhelming US military force. While China’s growing economic power is allowing the expansion of Chinese military forces, these forces are not now, nor are the likely to be in the near future, peer competitors with US military forces. Therefore, non-peer scenarios are developed.
This situation of the US vis-à-vis its largest strategic competitor is not new. During the Cold War the Soviet Union had more tanks in Europe than NATO forces, and more ground-based ICBMs, but it was common knowledge that Soviet technology lagged behind US technology, and that the Soviets were not peer competitors with NATO, especially on the world’s oceans, which have been controlled and policed by the US Navy since the end of the Second World War. The Soviets, like the Chinese, were primarily a land power. The US, with coasts on two oceans and trade that spans the globe, is a sea power that need not even be concerned with its territorial integrity, dominating North America as it does.
I have several times written about the weapons systems developed by the Soviet Union to counter disproportionate US advantages, especially technological advantages, including the development of hypersonic missiles such as the P-270 Moskit (cf. The Political Context of Striking a Carrier) and hypersonic cavitating torpedoes such as the VA-111 Shkval (cf Sinking a Carrier: Proof of Concept). These products of late Soviet military technology still represent a viable and inexpensive option to countering the overwhelming US aircraft carrier presence on the world’s oceans. Appropriately updated, such asymmetrically conceived weapons systems would be appropriately devastating.
The principles of asymmetrical warfare are perennial, so that we can expect the Chinese, formulating their plans under similar constraints to those of the Soviet Union, and in the context of a world not dramatically different in political structure, to follow in the steps of the Russians, though they may well pursue asymmetry with Chinese characteristics. Actually, to be more accurate and to express myself in accord with the concepts I developed in Axioms and Postulates of Strategy, I should say that the axioms of warfare are perennial, and they are supplemented by the postulates of asymmetrical warfare, which latter take account of particular circumstances but still embody a high degree of generality.
Recently in The Shadow of War I defined asymmetrical warfare as follows:
“We can define symmetrical warfare as peer-to-peer conflict, and from this point of departure we can define asymmetrical warfare as anything other than peer-to-peer conflict — in brief, non-peer conflict. It is not so easy to arrive at a similarly neat distinction between conventional and unconventional warfare. This is because, while the peer-to-peer concept can be given an absolute formulation in terms of identity, with imperfect real-world instances approximating identity to some degree (or perhaps invoking essential identity, notwithstanding contingent differences), the difference between conventional and non-conventional warfare is a much more gradual scale in which incremental, contingent differences are important.”
To define asymmetrical warfare as “anything other than peer-to-peer conflict” is admittedly very broad. We tend to think of asymmetrical conflict as a sub-category of conventional warfare, and therefore a more limited notion. Here the recent recognition of asymmetrical conflict in strategic thought works against us. The novelty of the idea should not prevent us from seeing that most conflict throughout human history has been asymmetrical, though it is only in recent decades that the term has been employed. That being said, peer-to-peer conflict, which has implicitly defined conventional warfare, is almost as broad a category of thought once we allow from the qualifications of conditions that all ideas must make in accommodating themselves to the actual world.
Within the concept of asymmetrical warfare we can make a distinction between non-state asymmetrical warfare and state-sponsored asymmetrical warfare. As soon as we make this distinction we see that, just as we have implicitly thought of conventional warfare as the paradigm, such that any deviation from the paradigm yields strategic heterodoxy, so too we have implicitly thought of asymmetrical warfare as intrinsically non-state warfare. But this is not the case. State-sponsored asymmetry is not new to the strategic posture of nation-states. State-sponsored terrorism has long been an asymmetrical weapon of war, while state-sponsored irregular militant proxies was the asymmetrical weapon of choice during the Cold War, humbling the US in Vietnam and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.
I hope to return to this idea, as a more thorough and complete treatment of these questions implies a schema of distinctions that would recognize state vs. state, state vs. non-state, non-state vs. state, and non-state vs. non-state (assuming that in this two-term relationship the first term is the attacker and the second term is the defender). I will leave this explication for a later time.
When a nation-state puts its resources into asymmetrical weapons systems it can take these systems far beyond the bricolage of irregular guerrilla forces. We have seen this recently with many initiatives undertaken by Iran. Iran cannot control the Strait of Hormuz, but it is positioned to harass any power that would attempt to control the Strait of Hormuz, and to harass a conventional force and lower its efficacy in achieving its mission is pretty much the original intent behind all asymmetrical initiatives.
While a nation-state brings uncharacteristic levels of resources to asymmetrical weapons systems, its also brings weaknesses peculiar to the institutional character of the nation-state. Among these weaknesses are the lack of a coherent and systematic doctrinal context for the use of asymmetrical weapons systems. For irregular fighters employing asymmetrical weapons systems, there is an immediate feedback on the battlefield, at which time a squad of irregular fighters will expect to improvise and to adjust their tactics on the run. Institutionalized military forces cannot rely on improvisation, or an expectation that its forces will appropriately improvise on the battlefield. Thus conventional military forces formulate doctrine, and they deploy their assets according to doctrine.
It should be easy to see intuitively that a conventional military force making use of unconventional, asymmetrical weapons systems is going to be a compromise. Asymmetrical weapons systems are most devastating in the hands of asymmetrical, unconventional, and irregular forces whose only doctrine is to be found in the instincts of the loosely organized band of fighters. Since fighters with poor instincts are quickly killed off, there is strong selective pressure on the battlefield that yields instinctively astute fighters who know how to hit and run with a high level of efficacy.
A conventional military institution is a very different creature. Its weapons systems have established training procedures, its soldiers are uniformly trained, and its commanders work their way up through a strictly defined hierarchy peculiar to the institution. In so far as I have previously defined war as the institutionalization of human violence (in The Shadow of War), well, a standing conventional army is the institutionalization of the institutionalization of human violence. In other words, conventional military forces constitute institutionalization of a higher order of magnitude.
One way to describe this difference between conventional and unconventional forces is by way of the Boyd Cycle. Success in implementing the Boyd cycle is predicated upon getting inside the decision loop of the adversary, anticipating and preempting every action of the adversary even before it is taken. Unconventional forces can do this nicely, since it is individuals on the battlefield making these decisions. Any conventional, institutionalized military cannot reduce its decision cycle to the level of the individual unless it explicitly delegates this power (which delegation is, in itself, an institutional action) to some particular individual. As an institution, a conventional military, with its rules and regulations and procedures and chain of command, can never preempt decisions taken on the ground by individuals with full freedom of action.
For these reasons, state-sponsored asymmetry will always be a compromise. That does not mean that this compromise will always be ineffective, only that it will not be as effective as asymmetrical action undertaken by irregular forces. Thus there is a balance: the nation-state brings disproportionate assets to asymmetrical conflict, but is hampered in the employment of these assets due to its institutional structure. On the other hand, irregular forces are able to bring far fewer assets to the theater than a nation-state, but is able to better deploy those assets that it does possess. The Chinese pursuit of a suite of “Assassin’s Mace” weapons systems as state-sponsored asymmetry must be seen in this context, and in so far as it is seen in this context, any adversary will exploit the intrinsic weaknesses present in this compromise.
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18 June 2011
Recently in Stealth Helicopter Technology I discussed some widely noted features of the helicopters used during the Bin Laden hit which seemed to be aiming at stealth operations. Ordinary helicopters are very loud and given plenty of warning of their presence, so that a stealth helicopter would have significant advantages in terms of surprise.
Now it seems that several helicopter manufacturers are working on other advanced helicopter technologies aimed at overcoming retreating blade stall and getting their birds to fly faster. The BBC story Helicopter with wings promises to change aviation world discussed the new Eurocopter X3. The BBC story also mentioned the Sikorsky X2, which had earlier topped 250 knots cruising speed.
The Eurocopter X3 and the Sikorsky X2 are being called “superfast” helicopters, those the two machines employ very different technologies. The Eurocopter X3 has a rotor on top and an extra sent of wings and engines for flight like a fixed wing aircraft once the rotor was gotten the chopper in the air. The Sikorsky X2 uses coaxial contra-rotating rotors, like the Russian Kamov Ka-52. It should also be noted that the V-22 Osprey also belongs in this class of aircraft that seek to combine the flexibility of helicopters with the speed of fixed wing aircraft.
Although the V-22 Osprey is currently deployed, it has had a troubled operational history. The idea is dead simple, and I can’t myself see why it has been so difficult to get the aircraft to function as intended. A contra-rotating coaxial rotor would seem to me to present greater engineering challenges that a tiltrotor. I expect that tiltrotor technology will be refined and improved over time, though the reputation of the V-22 has limited the efficacy of the aircraft because it is more or less seen as a deathtrap, and no one would want to take a problematic design into combat.
I view these innovative helicopter technologies with the greatest of interest, not least because I have speculated (in The End of the Age of the Aircraft Carrier) that helicopters have great room for improvement, and that, once helicopter technologies become sufficiently advanced and robust, we can see the day coming when helicopters will take over the role of tanks as the armored spearhead of an advancing military force.
Even the best combat helicopters remain vulnerable to relatively inexpensive counter-measures. The Somali militias that attacked US forces in Mogadishu — in the story that become Black Hawk Down — studied the movements of US soldiers prior to engaging them, and determined that their Achilles Heel was the helicopter. Once the Black Hawks were downed with RPGs the US forces had to fight their way through the city.
Thus there remains much room for improvement in helicopter stealth, speed, and survivability. Note that the above-referenced “superfast” helicopters are capable of about 250 knots. While this is an improvement over previous helicopter technology, a Nakajima Ki-84 fixed wing fighter from the Second World War could travel at 340 knots, so it is easy to see that helicopters are never going to rival fixed wing aircraft in terms of speed; helicopters have a very different role to play than that secured by speed.
I would look for further (mostly incremental) improvements in stealth, speed, and survivability, as well as the testing of innovative designs such as those mentioned above. I would also look for improvements in armor (which could be considered an aspect of survivability) and in the design, orientation, and placement of the engines that would also afford greater survivability under combat conditions.
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31 May 2011
A Deal for a Russian-Built Helicopter
Presents Opportunities for both East and West
An item in the Financial Times, Russia signs Afghan arms contract with US, drew my attention to the fact that the Pentagon has concluded a deal with Russian firm Rosoboronexport (the Russian state arms export monopoly) to purchase twenty-one (21) helicopters from the Mil helicopter production facility in Kazan. The article in the Financial Times led me to another article in The Hindu, Russian choppers for Afghanistan, which named the specific model of the helicopter, and which quoted Sergei Prikhodko, an aide to Russian President Medvedev, as saying, “It is the first large contract Russia signed directly with the U.S. Ministry of Defence.”
This deal is interesting in so many ways that it would be difficult to spell them all out. For starters, the Mi-17 was purpose-built for Russian operations in Afghanistan, which means that the helicopter is particularly suited to these operations, and the Afghan pilots are familiar with it. The Pentagon has defended the deal on this basis — and it is an eminently reasonable basis — but the primary motivation for the deal, according to the Financial Times, was political. And we certainly know that we have come a long way from the Cold War when the former existential foes are willing to enter into a arms purchasing agreement.
While the Financial Times article says, “There has been no question of a return of Russian troops to Afghanistan,” the article in The Hindu states that, “Russia will also provide spare parts, ground support equipment and maintenance services.” That is to say, there certainly won’t be any Russian combat troops in Afghanistan, but there will be technical support. This is one foot in the door, and an important foot. While at the present moment it is nearly inconceivable that Russian troops would participate in a NATO mission, it is eminently conceivable that this would happen in the future, and not in the terribly distant future, either. For one thing, the Russians are very concerned about security on their border, and this partly explains with cooperative relationship with NATO. For another thing, Russian technical and maintenance personnel could at some time be used as a justification for Russian security personnel to supervise their countrymen.
Another foot in the door is the simple fact of minimal US-Russian cooperation in the ‘Stans. This crucial region on the European periphery is known for harboring terrorists and criminals, and is also known for arms trafficking. Vast tracts of this relatively uninhabited land are lightly policed if at all, and arms continue to flow over ancient trails on pack animals, as they have moved for thousands of years through this region. This tradition did not begin with US covert operations (I’m thinking of the Stinger missiles that went through Pakistan to pre-Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan) in the region, and it certainly did end with the termination of this particular arrangement. The method is slow but sure, tested by time, and sure to continue.
Another foot in the door is the bare fact of a US-Russian arms purchasing agreement. Whether we think of this as a foot in the door for Russia or a foot in the door for the US doesn’t really matter. There are opportunities for both sides here, and if rational heads prevail, cooperation could benefit both in numerous ways. This cooperation could be very easily derailed by the equivalent of another Chechen War or another Georgian War, or even the US taking robust steps for formal security arrangements with Georgia or Ukraine. The latter now seems unlikely, but the former is not out of the question.
While there are benefits and risks for each party to this deal, clearly the benefits outweigh the risks. The risks are primarily the sort of events the erupt such as I mentioned above; ultimately these events are less important than the shared US-Russian desire for stability, which is predicated upon structural concerns of the region rather than episodic grievances that sometimes inspire violence and militancy. Indeed, the desire for stability is precisely the desire to avoid sudden and unexpected wars that tend to pop out of nowhere in the Balkans and the Caucasus.
With this observation, and the continuing focus on stability and joint US-Russian interests, we can see our way clear to future settlements in problematic regions like Georgia and Ukraine, and perhaps even long-standing disputes such as the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave. If no unpleasant surprises derail US-Russian cooperation, this cooperation would expand to other matters, and possibly even in the fullness of time the relationship could expand to the point of not merely hoping that a political explosion will not derail peace, progress, and prosperity, but perhaps could lead to proactive efforts to settle disputes in such a way that the political explosions are minimized and do not result in the outbreak of wars. This is perhaps a hopeful observation, but it is not impossible.
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6 May 2011
Back in 2004 Foreign Policy magazine invited a number of writers to pen short pieces on ideas that were destined for the dustbin of history. Among these contributions, Francis Fukuyama of “end of history” fame wrote a page about transhumanism. Now, not many people know what transhumanism is, so it is hard to view it as a threat, say, on a level with the Soviets during the Cold War, but that was the target that Fukuyama chose to dispose of. For me, this was a laugh out loud moment in the history of ideas, because Fukuyama essentially argued that transhumanism can’t or won’t happen because it poses nearly insuperable moral dilemmas for us. This would be a but like arguing before the Second World War that the Holocaust couldn’t happen because of the moral implications of such a crime. Well, sheer horror never stopped human beings from doing anything. Or, rather, if it has been a barrier to some, it certainly has not been a barrier to all.
To give you some flavor as to exactly what transhumanism is, and to do so from a sympathetic source, I found a Transhumanist Declaration at the Humanity+ blog, which I reproduce below in its entirety:
1. Humanity stands to be profoundly affected by science and technology in the future. We envision the possibility of broadening human potential by overcoming aging, cognitive shortcomings, involuntary suffering, and our confinement to planet Earth.
2. We believe that humanity’s potential is still mostly unrealized. There are possible scenarios that lead to wonderful and exceedingly worthwhile enhanced human conditions.
3. We recognize that humanity faces serious risks, especially from the misuse of new technologies. There are possible realistic scenarios that lead to the loss of most, or even all, of what we hold valuable. Some of these scenarios are drastic, others are subtle. Although all progress is change, not all change is progress.
4. Research effort needs to be invested into understanding these prospects. We need to carefully deliberate how best to reduce risks and expedite beneficial applications. We also need forums where people can constructively discuss what should be done, and a social order where responsible decisions can be implemented.
5. Reduction of existential risks, and development of means for the preservation of life and health, the alleviation of grave suffering, and the improvement of human foresight and wisdom should be pursued as urgent priorities, and heavily funded.
6. Policy making ought to be guided by responsible and inclusive moral vision, taking seriously both opportunities and risks, respecting autonomy and individual rights, and showing solidarity with and concern for the interests and dignity of all people around the globe. We must also consider our moral responsibilities towards generations that will exist in the future.
7. We advocate the well-being of all sentience, including humans, non-human animals, and any future artificial intellects, modified life forms, or other intelligences to which technological and scientific advance may give rise.
8. We favour allowing individuals wide personal choice over how they enable their lives. This includes use of techniques that may be developed to assist memory, concentration, and mental energy; life extension therapies; reproductive choice technologies; cryonics procedures; and many other possible human modification and enhancement technologies.
To this the response of Francis Fukuyama is as follows:
“…we all possess a human essence that dwarfs manifest differences in skin color, beauty, and even intelligence. This essence, and the view that individuals therefore have inherent value, is at the heart of political liberalism. But modifying that essence is the core of the transhumanist project. If we start transforming ourselves into something superior, what rights will these enhanced creatures claim, and what rights will they possess when compared to those left behind? If some move ahead, can anyone afford not to follow? These questions are troubling enough within rich, developed societies. Add in the implications for citizens of the world’s poorest countries — for whom biotechnology’s marvels likely will be out of reach — and the threat to the idea of equality becomes even more menacing.”
Sure, it’s menacing, and change is frightening. No argument there. But asking the questions that Fukuyama asks — and they are certainly legitimate and interesting questions — is not going to spare us the moral nightmare of actually having to find a way to go on living despite menacing developments. And moral horror changes over time. When Malthus said that humanity would have to choose between misery and vice, the vice the horrified him, and which was perhaps no less of a horror to contemplate than mass starvation, was birth control. Now it is Malthus himself who is viewed with horror, not the birth control that inspired Malthus with horror. Only crackpots today attach any social stigma to birth control, and the world goes on its way.
Firstly, I should say — Profess? Declare? Proclaim? — that I don’t in the slightest identify myself as a transhumanist. Like the technological singulatarians, to whom they are closely related, they have some interesting ideas and a lot of predictions, but at the present moment transhumanism is as crackpot-ish as moral opposition to birth control. That doesn’t mean that it will always remain so, but only that it is not one of the world’s prominent evils (or even one of the world’s challenges) at the moment. We have much more to worry about when it comes to atrocities and genocide.
Why is transhumanism marginal at the present moment? Here we can return to Fukuyama, for the brief rant he penned against the transhumanists contains a salient and very true observation:
“…we have drawn a red line around the human being and said that it is sacrosanct.”
We have indeed done so. This is what philosophers call a “convention,” which in this context is not a bunch of beer-swilling salesmen staying together at a Holiday Inn, but a decision to adopt a certain standard, much like the metric system or English weights and measures, or indeed to adopt a particular way of thinking about the world. In my Variations on the Theme of Life I said the following about this particular convention:
“We have elaborately constructed conventional distinctions, embodied in law and social practices, that separate man from every other living thing, and so thorough is this contrived divide that even if no qualitative distinction in fact intervened between man and other living things, the distinction would remain absolute in virtue of the established conventions. But the system is imperfect, and breaks down upon close inspection, for just as all cultures construct the distinction between man and everything else that is not man, they construct it differently, and these different constructions cannot be honestly harmonized. Some animal species are deified, some are demonized, some are commodified, some are marginalized, and some are fetishized. The ideal unity of mankind, then, must be based either on dishonesty and dissimulation, or upon some as yet unsuspected human quality that can distinguish man without reference to cultural relativity.” (section 514)
There is another name for this convention, and that is speciesism. The idea that humanity belongs within a charmed circle is an ontological conception, but the convention to act as though this ontological principle were true (whether or not it is true) is the practical consequence of speciesism. As most people do not think abstractly about principles like this, the convention is likely to have a stronger hold on the mind than the principle, which, when stated as a principle in its explicit form, is likely to sound a bit odd and unfamiliar. But leave that aside for the moment.
It is the very speciesism that stands in the way of the technological development of human potential, keeping us within Fukuyama’s red line, isolated and insulated from the rest of life, that will ultimately facilitate the technological development of non-human species. And the perfection of these technologies of biological augmentation and modification in other species will foster an increasing temptation to apply this technology to human beings, despite whatever obstacles are raised, be they moral, legal, practical, or other. Even if initially consummated in secrecy, we can be certain that the temptation will not be avoided forever.
I realized this today when I was thinking about the now widely publicized presence of a dog with the commando team tasked with the raid on Osama Bin Laden’s hideaway. This detail attracted a lot of attention, and Foreign Policy magazine presented the photo essay War Dog, which rapidly became the most viewed story on their webpage.
It is well known that even the most alert soldier on duty is not nearly as aware as a guard dog on duty, and when it comes to specialized tasks like sniffing out explosives or persons, dogs are superior to the highest high technology. Dogs are now trained and valued in the armed forces as never before, and it would be an obvious development to augment the capacities of guard dogs. A dog with better eyesight or a better nose would be a great asset, and a competitive advantage over non-augmented dogs. Most importantly, the barriers to doing so simply don’t exist, or don’t exist in the same way. We don’t surround dogs with the same red line that we draw around human beings, even if we should.
In short, we will see transcanidism before we see transhumanism, and the former will, in the fullness of time, be the slippery slope that leads to the latter. And, yes, I know that the slippery slope is a logical fallacy; it is also a psychological truth, and what we are really discussing here is the psychology of the red line. That red line changes over time, and it changes in response to changed conditions. The red line that Malthus drew around population control still exists for us today, but it exists in a very different way, and it is drawn in a different place and between different alternatives.
There will be red lines in transcanidism too, but not enough, and not sufficiently robust, to prevent the process from starting down the slippery slope. For example, an obvious extension of improving canine senses would be to improve a dog’s mind. I am certain that most people would be deeply uncomfortable with this. There will be laws passed. There will be attempts to enforce a red line. In the long term, however, that line will be crossed. And once we begin to augment the intelligence of dogs and other war animals (or perhaps once we begin to engineer specialized war animals), they might conceivably catch up with us, or, as in the vision of the technological singularity, exponentially surpass us.
The reader should be fully aware that I am fully aware that what I am writing here would be received as anathema to many and as horrific to some. It has become the custom to discuss certain technological developments that touch directly upon human life in the rhetoric of high moral indignation. This is not helpful. In fact, I take it to be counter-productive.
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