It has been widely reported that Public Intelligence has released a 108 page document from the U.S. Department of Defense Non-Lethal Weapons Program, the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate (JNLWD), titled Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW) Reference Book and published in 2011. There isn’t much shocking or surprising in the document, and anyone who follows these things will recognize most of these NLWs as programs that have been under development for some time. However, the document is interesting to look through as an overview of such weapons systems, as it is heavy on pictures and descriptions and without much detail.

The document defines NLWs as:

“Weapons, devices and munitions that are explicitly designed and primarily employed to incapacitate targeted personnel or materiel immediately, while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property in the targeted area or environment. Non-lethal weapons are intended to have reversible effects on personnel or materiel.”

JROCM 060-09, Initial Capabilities Document for Counter Personnel Joint Non-Lethal Effects and Initial Capabilities Document for Counter Materiel Joint Non-Lethal Effects

And in the “frequently asked questions” there is this nice summary:

“NLW provide another ‘option’ to the force. In past operations, the effective employment of NLW resolved escalation of force situations. Specifically, the NLW created the right ‘direct effect’ on the personnel/materiel targeted. The use of NLW has also generated positive ‘psychological effects’ on others in the area and helped to contribute to mission accomplishment. The perceptions associated with the use of NLW have been a positive and powerful influence in local communities on ‘winning the hearts and minds’ of the local populace. The employment of NLW has helped reduce the loss of life and collateral damage.”

Implied but not explicitly expressed in this document is the danger of NLW being employed in such a way as to cause permanent injury or disfigurement to its targets. From the perspective of public diplomacy, the old “dead men tell no tales” adage holds: while I suspect most people would prefer to be alive even if injured to being killed, the fact remains that bodies are buried and forgotten, while an injured individual would likely enter into the 24/7 news cycle and could conceivably cause more damage to the political image of a nation-state employing NLW than outright killing of targets. The human interest angle here is impossible to avoid.

As interesting as this possibility is, it is not the most interesting thing about NLW. The most interesting thing about NLW is their paradigmatic role in the political constraints on weapons systems that are increasingly driving defense thinking. These political constraints on weapons systems are in turn a manifestation of a fundamental shift in warfighting away from major conventional engagements between peer powers to low-level, chronic unconventional and asymmetrical warfare.

Unconventional and asymmetrical warfare is the new reality for nation-states, and this poses a fundamental challenge to the nation-state system, since the nation-state itself is a consequence of the early modern socioeconomic organization of peoples in order to mobilize military forces for precisely those conventional engagements between peer powers that are now being overtaken by the events of history. There are so many aspects of this shift in warfighting that they cannot be easily summarized.

It is possible that NLW will play an increasing role in unconventional and asymmetrical warfighting (really, fighting that is no longer subject to the warfighting paradigm, to be more accurate about it), and at some time in the future NLW may well dominate military engagements. If you can simply shut down an adversary’s ships, tanks, and planes from a distance, that is both less costly and less dangerous than engaging them with live fire. Similarly, if you can stop a riot by incapacitating the crowd without killing large numbers of people, this is preferable.

One form that this continuum of violence will take is what I have previously called the weaponization of eliminationism, and by the responses of political entities to ongoing depredations kept below the threshold of atrocity.

In this context, warfighting comes to approximate peacekeeping, if not policing. This, too, is a challenge to the nation-state system, as in liberal democratic political theory the distinction between military forces and police forces has been an important one, but as police forces become more robust and military forces become less lethal, the operations of each will approximate the other, and they will tend to meet in the middle.

The pacifist’s dream of a world without war may well become true in the not-too-distant future, but a world without war will not be a world without violence. Instead of peer and near-pear powers engaging in discretely separated wars, there will be a constant backdrop of violence to most political events — a continuum of incident rather than a declaration of war — and the most effective (and most responsible) way to respond to this will be with NLW.

. . . . .


. . . . .

Grand Strategy Annex

. . . . .



crematoria ashes with Wittgenstein quote

At what point do we pass the threshold of atrocity? If a single death is a tragedy (and therefore not an atrocity) while a million deaths is a statistic (and therefore possibly an atrocity), at what point between one death and a million deaths do we pass the threshold of atrocity? This is what philosophers call a “sorites paradox” or a “paradox of the heap”: if you continue to pile grains of sand together, eventually they will form a heap, but when? What is the threshold of a heap?

I introduced the phrase “the threshold of atrocity” in The Moral Status of Non-Atrocities, in which I attempted to identify on-going forms of political brutality that fall short of atrocity but which nevertheless ruin countless lives. In that post I predicted that the world would see more violence and suffering that falls just short of the threshold of atrocity as a result of political calculations of tyrants and dictators who are learning to contain their depredations within limits that will not arouse the interest of the wider world (“rousing the sleeping giant,” as Mike Burleson put it in a recent New Wars post).

One form of near atrocity is population transfer. In his series of lectures for The Teaching Company, Utopia and Terror in the 20th Century, Vejas Gabriel Liulevicius discusses population transfer in his seventh lecture, “The Hinge of Violence.” He observes that after the First World War, with the ideological reconstruction of political entities as nation-states, the “problem” of ethnic minorities emerges. An ethnic minority within a nation-state putatively defined in terms of an ethnic nationality is a source of cognitive dissonance, like a splinter that festers and irritates. What does one do with a splinter? One removes it. Thus Liulevicius says of this peculiarly modern problem:

“As an expedient to deal with these new situations there was arrived at, by politicians, the notion of something that’s ubiquitously and euphemistically called “population transfer.” This is a case of a trend we will see repeatedly in the course of our lectures of the power of euphemisms, of code words, to cover up harsh human realities. “Population transfer” sounded, and was meant to sound, neat, humane, and efficient. The reality, however, was of a brutal, uprooting process of populations who were now to be moved around involuntarily.”

Liulevicius cites the example of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne between Greece and Turkey, which set a precedent for population transfer. He recounts how the uprooting of Greek Christian populations from Turkey and Muslim populations from areas in Greece and the Balkans became a series of horrors, and then remarks:

“…in spite of this bloody record of the Treaty of Lausanne, in spite of the atrocities and violence that accompanied the policy of population transfer, the mark that this procedure left in European intellectual history was quite different. It was truly starkly in contrast to the human reality that historians record. It was hailed by European historians of the time as a successful model of problem solving, of the redrawing of borders, of dealing with the supposed problem of ethnic minorities within new national states, and this hailing of so brutal an expedient, this euphemistic policy of population transfer, was truly to have ominous results…”

Thus Liulevicius clearly sees such “procedures” as atrocities, or at least as often involving atrocities, though he also remarks that few today recall the episode, and that it was viewed as a success in its own time. This atrocity, then, was not only not the focus of an intervention, but was seen as a model to emulate.

Population transfer is treated a little differently in another contemporary source, which calls it “expulsion,” though we can see how the two treatments are related. Daniel Goldhagen, in his Worse Than War (which I previously mentioned in Revolution, Genocide, Terror), distinguishes five levels of what he calls human eliminiationism. Of these five levels, expulsion is the third, coming between repression and prevention of reproduction. Goldhagen characterizes expulsion thus:

“Expulsion, often called deportation, is a third eliminationist option. It removes unwanted people more thoroughly, by driving them beyond a country’s borders, or from one region of a country to another, or compelling them en masse into camps. From antiquity to today, expulsions, often by imperial conquerers, have been common.”

Worse Than War: Genocide, Eliminationism, and the Ongoing Assault on Humanity, Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, pp. 15-16

One contemporary example of such euphemized violence that involves small scale brutality is the recent dispossession of white farmers in Zimbabwe. Recently the BBC ran a surprisingly soft piece on Robert Mugabe’s “land reform programme,” Zimbabwe’s new farmers defend their gains, in which some of the violence of the evictions is described but not given much attention, as the story focuses on the new farmers who have acquired the lands of those who were evicted. To call the process of evictions in Zimbabwe “land reform” is clearly in the tradition of a policy intended to sound “neat, humane, and efficient” but which in fact has involved widespread suffering. And that suffering is not primarily the suffering of the 4,000 or so white farmers. The primary targets of the violence of the evictions were the native employees of the farms, and the entire population of Zimbabwe has suffered horribly from the botched “land reform” that has meant a catastrophic fall in the country’s agricultural productivity. How are we to take the moral measure of the impoverishment of millions for the benefit of a few well-connected Zimbabweans who prosper because of their relation to the ZANU-PF party?

Is Zimbabwe’s “land reform” an atrocity? We have already seen that the attempt to define an atrocity involves us in a classic philosophical paradox. There are, of course, philosophical responses. An excellent book by Claudia Card, The Atrocity Paradigm: A Theory of Evil (a book imbued with the true spirit of philosophical inquiry, I must say, however much I disagree with parts of it), focuses on atrocities. Card writes:

“…evils are foreseeable intolerable harms produced by culpable wrongdoing… Evils tend to ruin lives, or significant parts of lives…” (p. 3)

Thus Card does not demand that atrocities be defined in terms of mass death, so we avoid the paradox posed by locating an atrocity between the tragedy of one death and the statistic of a million deaths. Further along Card writes:

“Why take atrocities as paradigms? Many evils lack the scale of an atrocity… Atrocities shock, at least when we first learn of them. They seem monstrous. We recoil of visual images and details… It is not for their sensationalism, however, that I choose atrocities as my paradigms. I choose them for three reasons: (1) because they are uncontroversially evil, (2) because they deserve priority of attention… and (3) because the core features of evils tend to be writ large in the case of atrocities, making them easier to identify and appreciate.” (p. 9)

While I agree in spirit with much of this, it misses what I have been trying to capture above. The near atrocities of expulsion or population transfer are not uncontroversially evil. As we have seen, such actions are sometimes employed as models of sound policy. Further, because near atrocities are not uncontroversially evil, the core features of evil are not writ large. On the contrary, the evils that I see growing in the world today, and which I also see as dominating the world of the future, are often writ in a very subtle script, and at times in invisible ink. Sometimes it is very difficult to discern the subtle, ongoing evil that distorts and disrupts lives in the millions. Precisely because mass, low-level suffering can come to seem the norm, one’s perspective can become distorted and evil no longer appears as evil, but just as the typical way of the world.

. . . . .


. . . . .

Grand Strategy Annex

. . . . .

%d bloggers like this: